![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() Both sides were able to temporarily achieve greater numerical advantages in certain times and places by concentrating forces. The Red Army didn’t keep getting bigger, but it maintained its size while the Wehrmacht steadily lost ground, literally and figuratively.Ī 2:1 advantage is significant, but falls short of the 3:1 force ratio that is generally regarded as necessary for attacking forces, and it’s a long way from the double-digit advantage that is often claimed. The Red Army in the field actually peaked in size in mid-1943, but the ratios continued to shift in its favor due to Germany’s inability to replace losses. Here’s another way of looking at the force ratios. Soviet mobilization efforts and steady German losses began to change the force ratios in 1942, but the Red Army only had a roughly 2:1 advantage from February 1943 until mid-1944 before maxing out at a little over 4: 1 at the very end of the war. The Red Army was outnumbered by Axis forces in 1941 at the beginning of Operation Barbarossa. In When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler, David Glantz and Jonathan House provide authoritative data on ratios of active forces on the Eastern Front. Some German sources and popular histories claim that the Red Army outnumbered the Wehrmacht by ten to one or even twenty to one. A better understanding of the past might shift our perceptions of the present. Army often had about the same numerical advantage over its enemies as did the Red Army. However, when you crunch the numbers, it turns out that Russian superiority has not been as great as most people believe. We also know that the “missile gap” and “bomber gap” were artifacts of faulty intelligence analysis. For instance, Michael Handel in 1981 wrote that “To claim that the USSR is emphasizing quantity over quality in military equipment is to foster a dangerous misconception”. True, some analysts argued for a more nuanced approach. The story was also standard fare during the Cold War, when the intelligence community frequently overestimated the quantitative side of Soviet capabilities while belittling its quality. Many Western histories accept this view, and it is standard fare in Hollywood, notably in the 2001 Enemy at the Gates. German generals propagated the myth of a Red Army comprised of faceless masses of troops, motivated only by NKVD rifles at their backs and winning only through sheer force of numbers. You can hardly find any account of Russia’s wars that does not use terms like “hordes,” “masses,” and even “ Neolithic swarms.” Quantity, it is believed, made quality almost irrelevant. When it comes to war, Russia is commonly perceived as favoring quantity over quality and winning mainly by overwhelming its opponents with hordes of poorly trained soldiers. The problem is, Stalin never actually said that, but it fits our stereotype about the Russian military so neatly that everyone believes he did. Joseph Stalin supposedly claimed that “ quantity has a quality all its own,” justifying a cannon-fodder mentality and immense casualties. ![]()
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